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This study investigates the eﬀects of bank equity connections and intellectual
property protection on enterprises’ innovation behavior, and the regulating
eﬀect of intellectual property protection on the relationship between bank
equity connections and innovation. In general, bank equity connections and
intellectual property protection not only signiﬁcantly increase innovation
input, but also improve innovation performance. However, the eﬃciency of
bank equity connections is inﬂuenced by the heterogeneity of enterprises and
the value orientation of the subjects. Bank equity connections have a more sig-
niﬁcantly positive eﬀect on innovation in private and central enterprises,
whereas the principal-agent problem and government intervention may
weaken the marginal contribution of bank equity connections to the innova-
tion of local state-owned enterprises. Bank equity connections and intellectual
property protection are complementary in promoting enterprise innovation.
Not only are the combined eﬀects of bank equity connections and intellectual
property protection greater than the individual eﬀects, but when the latter is
relatively weak, the former’s positive eﬀect on innovation is obviously weak-
ened and may even crowd out innovation.
 2016 Sun Yat-sen University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This
is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecom-
mons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Since the beginning of its economic reforms in 1978, China’s market-orientation and property rights have
created a ‘‘growth miracle.” However, this growth has excessively relied on high input, high consumption and
high emissions. The lack of independent innovation and technological progress has limited the intensive and
eﬃcient use of resources and sustainable economic growth (Wu and Mi, 2011; Chen and Hu, 2011). The rapid
increase in labor costs, the increase in resource environment pressure and shrinking external demand have
resulted in increasingly negative externalities in this low-end economic growth pattern. Therefore, strengthen-
ing technological progress, changing the mode of economic growth, and improving the ability to innovate and
gradually shift from factor-driven economic growth to innovation-driven economic growth are urgent tasks.
In fact, increasing innovation and building an innovative country were emphasized in China’s 12th 5-year
plan. But the current outlook for innovation development is not optimistic. Although the ratio of R&D
expenses to sales revenue in large- and medium-sized industrial enterprises increased from 0.48% in 1996 to
about 0.93% in 2010, the level of innovation input still fell behind that of developed countries. According
to Hall and Oriani (2006), the ratio of R&D expenses to sales revenue in the United States, Britain, Germany
and France is 4.9%, 2.9%, 4.5% and 4.2%, respectively. In 1992, R&D expenses reached 1.97% of GDP, a
record; however, the ratio has reached 2.66%, 1.86%, 2.40% and 2.16%, respectively, in the United States,
Britain, Germany and France, since the end of the 20th century.2 Furthermore, the conversion rate for scien-
tiﬁc and technological achievements in developed countries is more than 80%, whereas in China, the conver-
sion rate is very low, only 20%, and the authentic industrialization rate is less than 5% (Xiao and Wang, 2014).
Accordingly, understanding why investment in innovation and the eﬀects of such investment are so low in
Chinese enterprises, and how to promote innovation are important issues both theoretically and practically.
Enterprise innovation can be easily restricted by ﬁnancing limitations due to its high risk, long incubation per-
iod and information asymmetry. Access to a steady stream of ﬁnancial support may be a key factor in inno-
vation decisions. Enterprises’ ﬁnancing channels include internal ﬁnancing and external ﬁnancing. Although
internal ﬁnancing provides higher autonomy and less risk, using internal ﬁnancing to fund an innovation pro-
ject may be diﬃcult, not only due to the constraints imposed by corporate earnings and business ﬂuctuations,
but also because of ownership structure, management incentives, investor risk appetite, institutional investors
governance, product market competition and so on (Lin et al., 2011a, 2011b, 2011c; Aghion et al., 2005, 2013;
Li and Song, 2010; Becker-Blease, 2011; O’Connor and Raﬀerty, 2012; Lu and Dang, 2014; Sapra et al., 2014;
Tian and Wang, 2014). Therefore, access to external capital is of paramount importance to ease the risk of
investing in innovation. In fact, there are several studies of the relationship between external ﬁnancing and
innovation in China. Using an innovation resource acquisition research perspective, Brown et al. (2013),
Chemmanur et al. (2014) and Cornaggia et al. (2015) investigate the relationships of enterprise innovation
with stock ﬁnancing, corporate venture capital and credit ﬁnancing, respectively. Hsu et al. (2014) use the data
of 32 developed countries and emerging markets and examine the eﬀect of the securities and credit markets on
enterprise innovation at the national level. Domestic scholars Xie and Fang (2011) ﬁnd that banking reform
and regional ﬁnancial development promote investment in innovation in Chinese enterprises by expanding
ﬁnancing channels. Using the World Bank’s survey data of more than 12,000 Chinese enterprises, Ma et al.
(2014) ﬁnd that the acquisition of bank credit can increase the probability of R&D and the intensity of inno-
vation by 8.6% and 0.24%, respectively.
Although these scholars reveal the transmission mechanisms that transform external ﬁnancing into enter-
prise innovation, these studies are mainly based on institutional environments in developed countries, such as
the USA and Britain, and their basic assumptions and logical deductions may not be eﬀectively migrated to
emerging markets such as China. Therefore, their ﬁndings may not reasonably explain, forecast or guide
innovation behavior in China. For instance, although with the rapid development of China’s capital market,
securities ﬁnancing and credit ﬁnancing have become the two most important external ﬁnancing channels for2 Source: China Statistical Yearbook (1996–2013). Before 2011, this yearbook separately disclosed the R&D expenses and sales income
of China’s large- and medium-sized industrial enterprises. In 2011, the large and medium-sized industrial enterprises were grouped into the
category of above-scale enterprises; this yearbook did not separate large- and middle-scale enterprises, nor did the ﬁnancial reports reveal
information about scientiﬁc or technological innovations. Therefore, the data are only for the ﬁscal year that ended in 2010.
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listed enterprises, is still dominated by credit ﬁnancing. This greatly weakens the ability of securities ﬁnancing
to promote enterprise innovation.3
Furthermore, in existing studies, enterprises are viewed as passive recipients in an external ﬁnancing envi-
ronment; thus, these studies ignore the innovative behavior of enterprises facing external diﬃculties, the trans-
mission channels of innovation and the eﬀect of the external environment on micro transmission mechanisms.
During economic transfers, the imperfections in China’s capital market and institutional arrangement distort
the factor market and resource mismatch problems (Xu, 2011; Zhu and Lu, 2011, 2012). The low eﬃciency of
both the market and government also encourages enterprises to invest in social capital, such as building polit-
ical connections, hiring executives with ﬁnancial backgrounds and so on, to obtain resource allocation advan-
tages (Liu et al., 2013; Cull et al., 2015). However, compared to these indirect associations, the equity
connections established by holding bank ownership are a much more direct association; this strategy has been
widely used in emerging markets, but has not received attention from scholars (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007;
Chen and Chen, 2012). According to statistics collected by the author, approximately 14.79% of Chinese man-
ufacturing listed companies hold more than 2% of the total ownership of a bank. In recent years, to strengthen
our economy and compete with foreign rivals, our government, learning from the development experiences of
neighboring countries, has issued a series of realization measures and preferential policies,4 that encourage
and guide non-ﬁnancial capital into the ﬁnancial sector. These measures will undoubtedly further highlight
the eﬀect of bank equity connections on the economy. Unfortunately, this phenomenon has not been exam-
ined in academic circles; few studies have analyzed the mechanisms and economic consequences of bank equity
connections from an innovation perspective. This is also important because the mechanisms through which
bank equity connections aﬀect enterprises’ ﬁnancial decisions are also aﬀected by corporate governance mech-
anisms and the external institutional environment.
After a series of substantial structural reforms, such as the ‘‘State retreats and private advances” reform,
and the reform of the share system, China’s original state-owned enterprises gradually converted into modern
joint-stock enterprises through various means, such as spin-oﬀ listings, binding listings, holistic listings. But in
the current transition period, the inﬂuence of ultimate property rights on enterprise innovation still exists and
must not be overlooked. Although the government considers innovation as the primary driver of economic
transformation, they also have to consider employment, economic growth and multiple other targets when
promoting innovation, and they must incorporate these targets into their state-owned enterprises. The govern-
ment’s strategic plans continuously change along with the actual economic situation; funding innovative pro-
jects would not only bring numerous risks but would also inﬂuence technological innovations in private
enterprises. Even more seriously, the current government performance assessment system, which takes
GDP as the key measure, makes government oﬃcials and state-owned enterprise executives prefer short-
term goals and short-term investment, as they carry less risk over brief and uncertain tenures. This leads to
a reduction in innovation investment, which has high risks and a long periodicity. Thus, the resource alloca-
tion function of bank equity connections can be easily diverted to the rent-seeking channels of government
oﬃcials or state-owned enterprise executives.3 Unlike some regions such as Europe and the Americas, the centerpiece of China’s ﬁnancial system is credit ﬁnancing, and securities
ﬁnancing is underdeveloped. According to the executive report of China’s central bank on monetary policy disclosure, from 2006 to 2012
foreign currency loans, entrustment loans, trust loans, no discount bank draft, corporate bonds and stock ﬁnancing were, respectively,
65.82%, 7.01%, 6.44%, 7.86%, 9.46% and 3.42% of the capital that the real economy obtained from the ﬁnancial system. Because political
interference in private enterprises often results in low levels of corporate transparency and greater business risk, etc., private enterprises
have remained marginalized in the stock and bond markets (Zhu and Lu, 2011). Therefore, their dependence on bank credit may be larger.
The data from the China Stock Market, Accounting Research and Wind Information Co., Ltd. databases show that from 2006 to 2013,
many more Chinese listed companies were ﬁnanced with bank credit than with equity ﬁnancing. Speciﬁcally, despite IPO ﬁnancing, the
external ﬁnancing of China’s listed companies is still primarily bank loans. Thus compared to other nations and areas, equity ﬁnancing in
China plays a limited role in promoting innovation.
4 For example, in 1999 The People’s Bank of China issued interim provisions on ﬁnancial institutions. In 2004, the China Banking
Regulatory Commission formally published the ‘‘Management approach of the related transactions between commercial banks and
insiders or shareholders.” In 2011, China issued ‘‘Several opinions of the State Council on encouraging and guiding the healthy
development of private investment.”
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protection environment or a mechanism that reduces the risk of information disclosure of R&D and protects
the rights of creative subjects (Lerner, 2009). However, due to the absence of intellectual property protection,
independent innovation in China is severely suppressed and there is abnormal dependence on social networks;
in particular, government connections that can be used to obtain ‘‘relationship rents” are preferred over inno-
vation investment (Xiao and Wang, 2014). Since the enactment of its patent law in 1992, China has promul-
gated a series of judicial interpretations, implementation details and administration regulations meant to
protect creative subjects, but the diﬃculties in reporting, investigating and collecting proof, oﬀering testimony,
and dealing with the law enforcement process still negatively aﬀect the protection of creative subjects’ rights.
Under the circumstances, it is doubtful whether the resource allocation advantages of bank equity connections
can promote innovation. Today, China is at a critical juncture and the government is promoting structural
adjustment of the economy and seeks to enhance the quality of economic development by strengthening
autonomous innovation.
This study analyzes the transmission mechanisms of bank equity connections in innovation investment and
innovation performance and investigates the diﬀerent eﬀects of bank equity connections in diﬀerent enterprises
and how the interaction between bank equity connections and intellectual property protection stimulates
domestic innovation. This research not only enriches our understanding of relevant topics, it also oﬀers sug-
gestions for increasing innovation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, this paper discusses the mechanisms and eﬀect of bank
equity connections on enterprises’ innovative behavior, observes the diﬀerent eﬀects of bank ownership on dif-
ferent enterprises, and reveals the ‘‘black box” between bank equity connections and corporate innovation. It
not only explains the reasons why more and more enterprises are inclined to invest in banks, it also contributes
to the empirical study of this topic. Second, although previous studies have used the intellectual property pro-
tection index to investigate the inﬂuences of the institutional evolvement of intellectual property protection on
enterprise innovation, we use the distribution density of patent agencies and the scale of technology transfer to
describe the knowledge protection environment, which helps to improve the depth and objectivity of our argu-
ment. Finally, this paper embeds bank equity connections into the transmission mechanism of intellectual
property protection and the value orientation of governing bodies, reveals the connection between enterprises’
initiatives and institutional evolution, and establishes a bridge between macroeconomic reforms and the micro
behavior of enterprises. Today, China is trying to develop a ﬁnancial system that is suitable for its special
national conditions, and the main questions for this system are how to guide and standardize non-ﬁnancial
capital into the ﬁnancial sector and how to introduce competitive drivers and property right constraints that
will optimize incentives and constraint mechanisms of commercial banks. The conclusions provide a theoret-
ical basis and some empirical support for answers to these questions.
This article is organized as follows. Section 1 is the introduction section, Section 2 presents the theoretical
analysis and research hypotheses, Section 3 describes the research sample and model, Section 4 presents the
results and analysis, Section 5 is an extended test of the data and the ﬁnal section contains a discussion of
the results and some recommendations.
2. Theoretical analysis and research hypotheses
2.1. Bank equity connections, enterprise heterogeneity and enterprise innovation
In the perfect capital market described in MM theory, enterprises always have access to ﬁnancing at the
same cost as internal funds; the only factor determining whether enterprises innovate is the marginal value
of their innovative projects (McLean et al., 2012). In reality, however, the imperfection of the capital market
and the lack of institutional arrangements distort the conﬁguration of China’s capital market. Information
asymmetry, caused by adverse selection and moral hazards, means that innovation investment is a capital
investment requiring high investment, high risks and long-periodicity. It is diﬃcult for investors or creditors
to appraise the real risk and value of innovation investment, and the external capital market, which uses com-
petition and price mechanisms to allocate resources, is not always eﬀective (Rajan and Zingales, 2001; Beck
and Levine, 2002); this results in the ‘‘lemon market” problem (Leland and Pyle, 1977). In this environment,
X. Liu, S. Jiang / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 207–233 211innovation investment can reduce an enterprise’s ability to mortgage and will have a direct eﬀect on their abil-
ity to acquire external resources (Brown et al., 2009). Therefore, to avoid the defects of the market and system,
companies have intense motivation to seek alternative ﬁnancing mechanisms; developing a bank equity con-
nection is a common mechanism in many emerging market countries. We argue that this connection between
ﬁnancial markets and enterprises provides resource support and other synergistic eﬀects through multiple
paths.
According to resource-based theory and social capital theory, the network of social relationships formed by
a bank equity connection can help to mobilize or secure necessary resources for enterprises’ innovations. This
can be of critical importance in China’s economic transitional context (Allen et al., 2005). First, information
asymmetry, and the moral hazard and adverse selection problems caused by information asymmetry, are the
key factors in ﬁnancing. However, partial ownership of a bank can bring ﬁnancial advantages by improving
the exchange of information between lenders and borrowers. A bank equity connection can promote informa-
tion sharing and business coordination between banks and enterprises through compact and organizational
arrangements, and can internalize external ﬁnancing. This not only reduces the risk of information disclosure
of R&D, it also helps to solve the problem of funding innovation through asset replacement, reducing loan
restrictions, increasing credit and so on.
The cooperative atmosphere created by bank ownership also helps to improve information collection and
the supervision of an enterprise’s actions. Haubrich (1989) points out that long and stable business relations
encourage information production and the supervision of lenders, and so strengthen governance. Zhai et al.
(2014) also ﬁnd that a bank–enterprise relationship introduces market supervision into enterprises and that
‘‘interior market management” promotes the supervision and regulation of the behavior of both large share-
holders and management. For this reason, a bank equity connection may cultivate innovation because the
‘‘EBC” itself may alleviate the agency problem. A bank equity connection can also function as a reputation
authentication or guarantee mechanism that signals corporate ﬁnancing capacity. Other external borrowers
may think that a bank equity connection guarantees the quality of relationship loans, because they believe that
the information advantages and the nepotism formed by bank ownership mean that the loans from the rela-
tionship banks are implicitly guaranteed, thus reducing information asymmetry and easing ﬁnancing con-
straints (Chen and Chen, 2012; Lu et al., 2012; Liu and Jiang, 2015).
In China, political interference and the low eﬃciency of commercial banks exacerbate the mismatch
between basic resources and the funding risks of innovative projects; as a result, there is a phenomenon of
scale and ownership discrimination in the resource allocation process (Song et al., 2011; Zhu and Lu, 2011,
2012). This means that some quality innovation projects are delayed or shelved and reduce innovation invest-
ment. A bank equity connection can partially alleviate such discrimination in the allocation of resources, and
thus alleviate the ﬁnancing constraints of innovative projects. Knowledge and ability also play important roles
in ﬁnancing management; many companies encounter trouble in ﬁnancing due to a lack of high-quality ﬁnan-
cial talent, but holding bank ownership can optimize an enterprise’s knowledge structure and intellectual cap-
ital. The knowledge integration between banks and enterprises can lead to tailor-made innovative ﬁnancing
schemes such as structured ﬁnancing.
Last but not the least, social networks built through bank equity connections can boost the formation of
social capital, such as political connections and relationships. This not only helps with project ﬁnancing, it also
helps to capture other scarce resources such as tax breaks, government subsidies and so on. According to
capability-based theory, a bank equity connection not only means that enterprises can obtain abundant
resources, they can also enhance the dynamic capability of resource allocation, including absorptive capacity,
integration capability and innovation ability (Wang and Ahmed, 2007). Absorptive capacity refers to the
capacity to identify values and to identify and master external knowledge and embed it in management deci-
sions. It is a capacity based on the awareness, precognition, and assessment and application of an external
knowledge source. Enterprises with strong absorptive capacity can sense, acquire and integrate external infor-
mation and knowledge, and obtain sustainable competitive advantages. Such enterprises emphasize the impor-
tance of knowledge and experience. In fact, it is the information sharing and knowledge integration advantage
of holding bank ownership that allows a bank equity connection to improve an enterprise’s absorptive capac-
ity and promote the value identiﬁcation, scientiﬁc assessment and decision-making optimization of innovation
investment.
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tion and dynamic management. The ﬂexible allocation of resources and the adjustment of business strategies
help to cope with volatility in the external economic environment; that is, integration capacity reﬂects the
inner organizational eﬃciency of enterprises and the integration between enterprises and the external environ-
ment. Bank equity connections improve integration ability in two ways. First, it can set up an internal capital
market that includes banks, and thus gets around the ﬁnancing restrictions of the external market by central-
izing management and internal capital market operations. This eases the pressure on capital allocation due to
the cash ﬂow characteristics of cross-complementary behavior, cross-subsidization, etc. Second, there is a
tremendous amount of prophase investment and infrastructure investment that must occur to turn an idea
into a product. In that respect, the eﬀect of bank equity connections on resource conformity and managerial
collaboration can provide a solution to the resource dependence of innovation projects. In addition to pro-
moting the application and popularization of new technology, a bank equity connection can also help to
establish scale advantage and remove entry barriers, both of which promote the successful hatching of inno-
vation projects and claim the monopoly proﬁts of innovations. Overall, the eﬀect of bank equity connections
on innovation capability is a remarkable reﬂection of its eﬀect on improving the absorption and integrative
capacities of enterprises. Based on above analysis, we propose the ﬁrst hypothesis.
H1. Bank equity connections are positively related to the intensity of innovation investment.
Bank equity connections can independently aﬀect the innovation behavior of enterprises through two
paths: cultivating resource supplies and enhancing dynamic conﬁgurations. However, the complicated gover-
nance mechanisms of listed companies mean these paths are restricted by property right arrangements and the
value orientation of the governing body. Given this heterogeneity, the above-mentioned eﬀects may not occur
in all enterprises.
Cultivating resource supplies can be challenging, as China is still in an economic transition period, and the
distortion of the factors market and the lack of institutional arrangements squeeze out the eﬀect of national
commercial banks, state-owned enterprises’ soft budget constraints and the shortage of the capital for private
companies, which generally face serious credit ration problems (Lin et al., 2010; Song et al., 2011; Li et al.,
2012). This situation reduces dependence on the resource advantage of a bank equity connection in national
enterprises, local state-owned enterprises and private enterprises. Furthermore, the value orientations of the
governing bodies of national enterprises, which are the main levers for adjusting the economy, are important
factors in economic and social development; they propel innovative national construction and promote eco-
nomic structural adjustments and upgrades. Thus, the legal regulation of central government-control enter-
prises is relatively complete.
However, in the process of transforming ‘‘made in China” into ‘‘created in China,” these central enterprises
are confronting waves of economic globalization, more complicated multilateral cooperation in international
relations and more intense competition in international education; these circumstances demand greater inno-
vation intensity and innovation performance. Thus, bank equity connections can obviously have a positive
inﬂuence on the innovative behavior of central enterprises. For local state-owned enterprises, although they
have greater talent development, technical exchanges, implicit state guarantees, technology innovation incen-
tives, etc., oﬃcials prefer ﬁxed asset investment projects that have less risk, more eﬃciency and high labor
absorption capacity, because they also promote employment, social stability, environmental governance,
GDP growth or other political achievements, and because currently government oﬃcials’ performance is
assessed by changes in GDP. Furthermore, the executives of local state-owned enterprises are not truly pro-
fessional managers, but rather administrative oﬃcials appointed by the government in some form; thus the
agency problem, which is caused by the separation of control rights and ownership, makes the executives
of local state-owned enterprises prefer short-term goals and short-term gains with less risk during their rela-
tively short and uncertainty terms. This is a better strategy for meeting the needs of political advancement and
other interest demands such as non-pecuniary compensation.
These factors distort the investment behavior of local state-owned enterprises (Chen and Chen, 2014).
Moreover, Tian (2005), Xin and Lin (2006), and Qian and Yeung (2015) ﬁnd that in China the governance
role of debt is ineﬃcient. First, the government’s implicit guarantee of state-owned enterprises encourages
ﬁnancial institutions to provide capital to state-owned enterprises and weakens their motivation to supervise
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interference in SOE investment lead to rapid expansion based on excessive debt and this distorts the debt gov-
ernance mechanism in local state-owned enterprises. Therefore, without eﬀective supervision, the strategy of
holding bank ownership may be alienated to the channels of managerial interests. Furthermore, bank equity
connections may also distort the debt governance in local state-owned enterprises by loosening budget restric-
tions. In other words, the resource advantage of bank equity connections strengthens the right seeking and
tunneling behavior of managers (Zhao et al., 2010; Peng et al., 2011; Li and Ma, 2014).
Therefore, the positive eﬀects of bank equity connections on local state-owned enterprises’ innovative
behavior may not be signiﬁcant, and may even be negative. But in private enterprises with clear property
rights, company executives are often the largest shareholders or agents appointed by the largest shareholders.
Accordingly, the principal-agent conﬂicts of private enterprises are relatively moderate. Moreover, ﬁerce com-
petition in the manager market can standardize and restrict executive behavior. Such managers dedicate
greater attention to the long-term interests of enterprises and actively innovate due to the incentives of inno-
vation proﬁts. In such cases, the resource advantage of bank equity connections may be enough to break
through their source constraints bottleneck. Accordingly, the potential innovation advantages of bank equity
connections are maximized in private enterprises. Based on the above analysis, we propose a second
hypothesis.
H2. The intensity of the positive eﬀects of bank equity connections on enterprises’ innovative behavior is
strongest in private enterprises, moderate in central enterprises and weakest in local state-owned enterprises.2.2. Bank equity connections, intellectual property protection and enterprise innovation
Scientiﬁc and technological innovation have several characteristics; they are non-competitive and non-
exclusive and have positive externality. In business, all of the above characteristics create the free-rider prob-
lem and enhance market failure (Romer, 1986). Survey data suggest that among China’s domestic companies,
rivals usually begin launching a similar product or substitutes within four to ﬁve months of a new product
entering the market (Xiao and Wang, 2014). As the motivation for innovation investment is proﬁt, the high
investment and high risk characteristics of innovation investments mean that enterprises will only invest in
innovations when there is the potential for high proﬁts. As intellectual property protection is the most impor-
tant institutional arrangement for supporting enterprise innovation, its role must not be neglected. First, the
protection of intellectual property rights, as a system guarantee, protects the private interest of the right’s
holder by granting them a legal monopoly. (Of course, such legal rights do not counter-act any other laws,
including antimonopoly laws.) This not only helps to compensate innovators for the prophase investment
of innovation by guaranteeing monopolistic proﬁt within the statutory time, it also reduces the problem of
the pricing of technology transformation caused by the emergence of substitutes. This ensures the economic
compensation of innovative investment and establishes a long-term stimulation mechanism (Yi et al., 2013).
Intellectual property protection also plays an essential role in the dissemination and promotion of techno-
logical information and the use of technology. For example, a strong patent protection regime can speed up
the dissemination of technological information, can greatly cut down on repeated investment, and allow other
innovators to stand on the shoulders of giants to develop new technologies and devices. This accelerates tech-
nical innovations and strengthens competition in the technology market (Moser, 2005, 2012). Finally, intellec-
tual property protection can ease the ﬁnancing constraints on innovative projects. Intellectual property rights
protection can reduce the uncertainty of innovation transformation by supporting the proﬁts of an innova-
tion, thus reducing the value evaluation risk and easing the information asymmetry in its ﬁnancing.
However, the highest degree of intellectual property protection is not always the best. The dual eﬀect of
intellectual property means that a lack of adequate intellectual property protection means that innovations
are liable to be infringed on and duplicated. This not only reduces interest in innovation, it also has a negative
eﬀect on accumulated resources and technology maturity. But a monopoly caused by strong intellectual prop-
erty protection might hinder market competition and reduce the driving force of innovation. Horii and
Iwaisako (2007) ﬁnd that innovation incentive requires a reasonable degree of intellectual property protection,
but blindly strengthening IPR protection may hinder economic growth. Thus, the protection of intellectual
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the long term.
China’s market, established under a period of economic transformation, is a nascent market that possesses
many immature characteristics. Although China has carried out a series of changes and additions so that leg-
islation related to intellectual property protection approaches and reaches the protection level seen in Western
countries, problems are still not solved eﬀectively and promptly, especially issues of group infringement, repeat
infringement, etc. There are widespread diﬃculties in reporting, investigating and collecting proof, oﬀering tes-
timony, treating and changing in the process of safeguarding rights. Even worse, in some provinces, the intel-
lectual property protection is weak, owing to uneven regional development in China. Accordingly, in the
current situation, strengthening IPR protection levels may have positive eﬀects on enterprises’ innovative
behavior (Lin et al., 2010). As mentioned above, the distortion of the factor market and the lack of institu-
tional arrangements seriously distort the innovative behavior of Chinese enterprises. This is reﬂected not only
in the restraints on external resources for, from the least to the greatest, private enterprises, local state-owned
enterprises and central enterprises, but also in alternative mechanisms of intellectual property protection, such
as administrative interference, restrictions on industry entrance or other preferential policies with which the
state-owned enterprises and especially the central-owned enterprises could conserve their power and earn prof-
its from innovations. Therefore, the dependence on intellectual property protection is diﬀerent for enterprises
with diﬀerent property rights. Based on above analysis, we propose a third hypothesis.
H3. Intellectual property protection is positively related to the intensity of innovation investment, and the
accelerating eﬀect of intellectual property protection is strongest in private enterprise innovation, moderate in
local state-owned enterprise innovation, and weakest in central enterprise innovation.
Both bank equity connections and intellectual property protection can promote business enterprise inno-
vation. A further question is whether there is any relationship between bank equity connections and intellec-
tual property protection in promoting innovation. From the theoretical standpoint, intellectual property
protection may aﬀect the relationship between bank equity connections and innovation through two contrary
mechanisms. First, both bank equity connections and intellectual property protection can ease resource allo-
cation constraints. Bank equity connections can also help to maintain the legitimate rights of creative subjects
by promoting the industrialization of innovation achievements, establishing market power and removing entry
barriers, etc. In other words, bank equity connections and intellectual property protection are substitutable to
a certain extent. Therefore, bank equity connections may reduce the dependence of innovative companies on
intellectual property protection. That is to say, the existence of one mechanism may reduce the dependence on
the other mechanism. However, there may also be a complementary relationship between them. The potential
interactions are as follows: (1) moderate intellectual property protection is a prerequisite for bank equity con-
nections to eﬀectively promote innovation. When the intellectual property protection is weak, the law is less
binding on infringers, and thus piracy, counterfeiting and other violations weaken innovation and reduce the
investment returns and enthusiasm of investors. In this case, even with the resource disposal advantage of
bank equity connections, enterprises may prefer less risky investments to innovation investment (Zhang
et al., 2011; Cull et al., 2015). (2) With the strengthening of intellectual property protection, the excess proﬁts
of innovation will also increase; thus, the innovation investment prompted by the bank equity connection can
create more value, i.e., it has a multiplier eﬀect on innovation. Moreover, the distortion of the factor market
and the absence of institutional arrangements in China mean that the transmission eﬀect of intellectual prop-
erty protection needs some complementary mechanisms, such as bank equity connections. Based on above
analysis, we propose a competitive hypothesis as follows.
H4a. There is a substitutional relationship between bank equity connections and intellectual property
protection in promoting innovation.
H4b. There is a complementary relationship between bank equity connections and intellectual property
protection in promoting innovation.
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3.1. Data and sample
This study examines the eﬀect of bank equity connections and intellectual property protection on ﬁrm inno-
vation, and the interaction between them in this process. The initial sample comprises all of the A-share man-
ufacturing and information technology listed companies for the 2006–2013 period. The ﬁnal sample is
obtained by ﬁltering this sample with the following conditions: (1) newly listed and specially treated companies
are removed; (2) observations with missing variables or with abnormal data are dropped; (3) ST companies,
and ﬁnancial and insurance companies are removed; (4) observations with leverage levels that fall outside the
outlier leverage levels of [0, 1] are excluded; (5) to avoid the consequences of diﬀerences in accounting stan-
dards, ﬁnancing environment, supervision mechanisms and so on, companies with stock in the A-share mar-
ket, B-share market and H-share market at the same time are removed; (6) taking into account the eﬀect of
acquisition, mergers and other non-recurrent activities on innovation investment, companies undergoing
major asset reorganizations in the 2006–2013 period are removed; and (7) companies with changes in actual
controllers are removed. In addition, to avoid the inﬂuence of outliers, all of the continuous variables are win-
sorized at the 1% and 99% levels. After the above procedure, the ﬁnal sample includes 4475 ﬁrm-year
observations.3.2. Definition of main variables
The innovation data, EBC data and intellectual property protection data (IPR data) are manually recon-
ciled. Based on the related regulations in China’s accounting standards and other relevant systems, we collect
and screen the innovation data from the information disclosure in ‘‘management expenses” and ‘‘cash pay-
ments relating to other ﬁnancing activities,” which are disclosed in the board reports, annual reports and
the notes to ﬁnancial statements.
The EBC data used in this study are collected from the WIND database, which is a leading integrated ﬁnan-
cial data service provider in China. We also apply the following treatments when sorting the EBC data: (1)
when companies hold many commercial bank shares, only the event with the maximum stake is considered;
(2) as a small investment in a bank may not have any material eﬀect on corporate capital allocation, according
to the principle of ‘‘essence is more important than form,” ﬁrms that hold less than 2% of a bank’s total own-
ership or that are not in the list of the 10 largest shareholders for banks are dropped5; (3) to avoid the ‘‘noise”
eﬀect of holding other ﬁnancial institution shares, we eliminate companies that have other ﬁnancial institu-
tions ownership but do not hold bank ownership.
For the other main explanatory variable, we select the following methods to measure the intensity of Chi-
na’s intellectual property protection (IPP). (1) The technology market trade of diﬀerent provinces, autono-
mous regions and municipalities (IPP1). That is, IPP1 is equal to the contract annual turnover of the
technology market in diﬀerent regions divided by the annual gross domestic product in the region. The essence5 According to the ‘‘Management approach of the related transactions between commercial banks and insiders or shareholders”
regulations, the China Banking Regulatory Commission formally published in 2004, associated subjects comprise connected natural
persons, legal persons or other organizations, which directly, indirectly and jointly hold 5%+ bank ownership shares or voting rights. But
according to the ‘‘Information Disclosure by Commercial Banks” regulations, in force since 2007, banks are required to disclose which
shareholders are in the list of the 10 largest shareholders for banks as these are regarded as large shareholders that can inﬂuence bank
policies and operation decisions. In fact, according to statistics collected by the author, due to the size and ownership structure of
commercial banks, holding 2%+ bank ownership shares or voting rights often requires a magnitude of funds and can enter the top ten
largest shareholders, and has an important impact on bank policies and operation decisions. Therefore, we choose holding more than 2%
of a bank’s total ownership and appearing on the list of the 10 largest shareholders for a bank as the deﬁnition criterion of ‘‘whether the
ﬁrms have a bank equity connection”. We focus only on non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms when we identify ﬁrms holding signiﬁcant bank ownership. In
addition, to ensure the reliability of our empirical results, we also choose 2%, 3% and 5% as the deﬁnition criterion, respectively. That is,
select the subsample of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms which hold 2%+, 3%+, and 5% bank ownership shares and use the propensity score matching
of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) to ﬁnd and screen the paired samples to re-examine the hypotheses of this paper. The conclusions are the
same as those reported. Due to the limited length of this paper, the manuscript is somewhat abbreviated.
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implementation of an intellectual property rights protection mechanism. Moreover, the laws protecting intel-
lectual property in China are mainly enforced locally (Long and Wang, 2014). Speciﬁcally, as technical con-
tracts can only be reached when people have conﬁdence that the law protects intellectual property, the trade in
the technology market can be used to measure the status of intellectual property protection in the region. (2)
The distribution density of patent agencies (IPP2).6 IPP2 is equal to the number of patent agencies in diﬀerent
regions divided by the total population in the area. The greater IPP2, the stronger the competition. Such
healthy competition keeps the cost of intellectual property protection low and the service much more compre-
hensive. Furthermore, the pressure of competition makes the patent agency step up publicity eﬀorts and
strengthen public awareness of intellectual property protection. Thus, using the distribution density of patent
agencies to measure the status of intellectual property protection is reasonable. These two measurement meth-
ods are not only objective, they characterize the propagation mechanism of the protection system for intellec-
tual property rights more carefully and thoroughly than the intellectual property protection index at the
national level.
3.3. Model design and definition of other concepts
In view of the possible endogenous relationship between bank equity connections and corporate character-
istics, we control for selection bias and endogeneity with Heckman’s (Winner of Nobel Prize in Economics in
2000) two-stage method and 2SLS. The ﬁrst phase is a probability type Probit regression, which is used to
estimate the probability of a bank equity connection; then, the forecast results are used to estimate the Inverse
Mills Ratio (IMR). Subsequently, the IMR is put into the second stage model to control and overcome the
eﬀect of self-selection and endogeneity on the empirical analysis.76 Th
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As stated, we run a Probit regression on the above model to estimate the probability of a bank equity con-
nection. To identify the ﬁrms with bank equity connections, we use an indicator variable, BEC, which equals
one if a ﬁrm holds more than 2% of a bank’s total ownership and is in the list of 10 largest shareholders, and
zero otherwise. Similarly, we identify whether a ﬁrm has political connections using an indicator variable,
Political, which is equal to one if a ﬁrm has a political connection, and zero otherwise. Additionally, based
on prior studies (Wu et al., 2012), we include control variables for the ﬁnancial deepening measure (FD), ﬁrm
size (Size), ﬁnancial leverage (Debt), a nature of property right dummy (State), growth opportunities (growth),
proﬁtability (ROA) and industry and year dummy variables. Debt is equal to total debt divided by total assets.
Size is deﬁned as the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on assets and is equal to net income
divided by total assets. Growth is sales growth and is equal to the diﬀerence between the sales in this year
and the sales in previous years, divided by the sales in the previous year. FD is deﬁned as the ratio of bank
loans to GDP in the province in which the ﬁrm is located. Industry and year dummy variables are included in
the model to account for time-invariant industry heterogeneity and time trends. Industry classiﬁcation is based
on that of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), which recognizes 21 industries, with a
one-digit code for non-manufacturing industries and a two-digit code for manufacturing industries.e data of the technology market trade are collected from the ‘‘Yearbook of Science and Technology of China”, published by the
tatistical bureau and the Ministry of Science and Technology. The data of the number of the patent agencies in diﬀerent regions are
ed from the ‘‘Annual Survey of patent agencies”, published by the State Intellectual Property Oﬃce (‘‘SIPO”). The study did not
to account the impact of the patent department of national defense because of the specialties of their operation. Furthermore, we
opped the samples in Tibetan regions because of missing data of IPP1 and IPP2.
control and overcome the eﬀect of self-selection and endogeneity, we also use the propensity score matching of Rosenbaum and
(1985) to ﬁnd and screen the paired samples. On this foundation, we set a control group that also takes part in the experiment. We
trastive analysis to assess whether there are diﬀerences in the innovation behavior between enterprises with bank equity connections
terprises without it; the conclusions are consistent with those reported in this paper. Due to limited space, we do not give the details
e tests.
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equity connections on investment intensity.8 Th
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The dependent variable, R&D, captures the intensity of ﬁrm innovation, and is equal to R&D expenditure
divided by total operating income. The explanatory variable is BEC. According to the theoretical analysis
aforesaid, a bank equity connection improves innovation by alleviating the resources stipulation of innovation
investment and enhancing dynamic conﬁguration capability. Therefore, we expect that R&D is positively
related to BEC. Moreover, in the selection of control variables, based on prior studies (Wu et al., 2012;
Fang et al., 2014; Acharya et al., 2014; He and Tian, 2013), we include the ﬁnancial deepening measure
(FD), ﬁrm size (Size), ﬁnancial leverage (Debt), cash ﬂow (CF), growth opportunities (growth), the proﬁtabil-
ity (ROA), a region dummy (Region) and industry and year dummy variables. The cash ﬂow ratio (CF) is
deﬁned as net cash ﬂow from operations divided by total assets. The region dummy is added to capture dif-
ferences in economic development, legal institutions (enforcement and judicial eﬃciency) and corruption
across regions. To test H3, H4a and H4b, using model (2), we introduce variables of the intellectual property
protection index (IPP) and the interaction terms between BEC and IPP to test the inﬂuence of intellectual
property rights protection on technological innovation and the relationship between bank equity connections
and innovation. According to the preceding theoretical analysis, whether or not companies have established a
bank equity connection, intellectual property protection will help to alleviate the resources stipulation of inno-
vation investment and to promote the value transformation of innovation achievements, and thus will encour-
age innovation. As such, we anticipate that the regression coeﬃcients of IPP1 and IPP2 to R&D are both
signiﬁcantly positive.8R&Di;t ¼ j0 þ j1BECi;t þ j2IPP r;t þ j3IPP r;t  BECi;t þ j4CF i;t1 þ j5Sizei;t1 þ j6Growthi;t1
þ j7Roai;t1 þ j8Debti;t1 þ j9Agei;t1 þ j10IMRi;t þ
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For context, to observe the diﬀerent eﬀects of diﬀerent properties (central enterprises, local state-owned
enterprises, private enterprise) on enterprises’ innovative behavior, we apply group testing according to prop-
erty rights. We compare the diﬀerences in the regression coeﬃcients between the groups using the Chow test,
and judge whether the diﬀerence in the groups’ regression coeﬃcients is statistically signiﬁcant (Prob > chi2).
The calculations and deﬁnitions of the variables (including the variables that are used in the extended test)
are shown in Table 1.4. Empirical results and analysis
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Tables 2 and 3 show the industry distribution of the ﬁnal sample and the distribution of the bank equity
connection sample by industry and year. The sample period is 2006–2013. The sample is composed of 4475
ﬁrm-year observations, including 662 ﬁrm-years (approximately 14.79% of the ﬁrm-years in the full sample)
in which ﬁrms hold more than 2% of a bank’s total ownership and appear on the list of the bank’s 10 largest
shareholders. Every industry except the wood and furniture industries contain ﬁrms with bank equity connec-
tions. In addition, 296 ﬁrm-years hold more than 5% bank ownership stakes.
The distribution by year of the BEC shows that there was a brief fall in the number of enterprises with bank
equity connections in 2007 and 2008; this is related to the exposure of related-party guarantees in the Delong
Department and the Green Cool scandal. Overall, the increase in the number of enterprises establishing bank
equity connections is an obvious trend. Hence, our sample suggests that holding signiﬁcant ownership ine use of interactive items results in the multi-collinearity problem. To this end, we did the VIF test, to weaken the inﬂuence of the
ollinearity problem. Following Kemp (2003), the data central processing method is used to process the interactive item data.
Table 1
Variable deﬁnitions.
Variable Name Deﬁnition and calculation
R&D Innovation investment R&D is equal to R&D expenditure divided by total operating income
OI Financial performance of
innovation
(Main business income  main business cost)/main business income; it can be used to
characterize the ﬁnancial performance of enterprises’ innovation
Tobin’s q Value performance of
innovation
The ratio of the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market
value of equity to the book value of assets; it can be used to characterize the value
performance of enterprises’ innovation
BEC Bank equity connection Equals one, if a ﬁrm holds more than 2% of a bank’s total ownership and appears on the
list of the 10 largest shareholders for a bank, and zero otherwise
IPP1 Technology market trade IPP1 is equal to the contract annual turnover of the technology market in diﬀerent
regions divided by annual gross domestic product in the region
IPP2 The distribution density of the
patent agency
IPP2 is equal to the number of patent agencies in a region divided by the total population
in the area
Political Political connection Political is equal to one if a ﬁrm has a political connection in which the chairman, general
manager or actual controller are or were NPC Deputies, CPPCC Members or
government oﬃcials at the county level or above, and zero otherwise
Size Firm size The natural logarithm of total assets
CF Cash ﬂow CF equals the net cash ﬂow from operations divided by total assets
Debt Financial leverage Debt equal to total debt divided by total assets
Growth Growth opportunities Growth is sales growth, calculated as the diﬀerence between this year’s sales and the
previous year’s sales divided by the previous year’s sales
Intangible Capital formation Intangible is equal to net intangible assets divided by net ﬁxed assets
ROA Proﬁtability ROA is return on assets, and is equal to net income divided by total assets
State Nature of property right
dummy
State
State is a dummy that equals two if the ﬁrm is ultimately controlled by the state-owned
Assets Supervision and Administration Committee (SASAC), and one if the ﬁrm is
ultimately controlled by the local government, and zero otherwise
Age Number of years listed The number of years between the annual ﬁnancial report and a ﬁrm’s IPO
Inv New investment Cash for buying ﬁxed assets, intangible assets and other long-term assets/total assets
Cash Cash holdings Calculated as the sum of cash and cash equivalents divided by non-cash assets. Of those,
non-cash assets are equal to total assets-money funds-tradable ﬁnancial assets-short-term
investments
DCash Net increase in cash and cash
equivalents
Calculated as the net increase in cash and cash equivalents divided by non-cash assets
Nwc Net working capital (Cash + short-term investments or tradable ﬁnancial assets)/total assets
(Current assets  current liabilities  cash and cash equivalents)/total assets
IMR Inverse Mills Ratio The Inverse Mills Ratio is estimated with Heckman’s two-stage approach, and is used to
control for selection bias and endogeneity problems
Region Region dummy Region dummies, which equal one if the observation belongs to a particular region, and
zero otherwise, controls for the eﬀect of other factors in the regiona
Year Time variable Year dummies equal one if the observation belongs to a particular year, and zero
otherwise
Ind Industry Industry dummies equal 1 if the observation belongs to a particular industry, and zero
otherwise. To make the sample distribution by industry sector more even, we use two-
digit industry codes for the manufacturing sector to control for industry factors in the
empirical estimation
a Using the methods to divide economic regions proposed by the State Council Development Research Center, we identiﬁed three
economic areas, east-region, middle-region and west-region, and set the region dummies. Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai,
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong and Hainan are included in the eastern region of China. Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang,
Jiangxi, Anhui, Henan, Hunan and Hubei are included in the central region of China. Sichuan, Shaanxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi,
Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai and Xinjiang are included in the western region of China.
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this study.
Table 4 shows the number of intellectual property agencies (except for the patent department of national
defense), the transaction scale of the regional technology markets and the average value of the intellectual
property protection index (IPP) in various provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities between 2006
Table 2
Industry distribution of sample ﬁrm-years and the distribution of BEC by industry.
Industry (industry code) Sample ﬁrms BEC = 1
Number of ﬁrm-years Number of ﬁrm-years Percent
Food and beverage (C0) 49 9 18.37
Textile, clothes and fur (C1) 198 32 16.16
Timber and furniture (C2) 10 0 0.00
Paper making and printing (C3) 92 8 8.70
Petroleum, chemistry, rubber and plastic (C4) 672 66 9.82
Electronic (C5) 350 55 15.71
Metal and non-metal (C6) 482 96 19.92
Machinery, equipment and instrument (C7) 1458 190 13.03
Medicine and biological products (C8) 650 116 17.85
Other manufacturing (C9) 45 18 40.00
Information technology (G) 469 72 15.35
Total (ﬁrm-year observations) 4475 662 14.79
Table 3
Distribution of BEC by year.
Fiscal year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total
Total sample 518 522 536 559 564 571 597 608 4475
Sample with EBC 86 71 70 79 83 86 91 96 662
Percent 16.60 13.60 13.06 14.13 14.72 15.06 15.24 15.79 14.79
Table 4
Intellectual property protection in China between 2006 and 2013.
Variable 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
The number of intellectual property agencies 582 593 642 676 717 775 823 896
The transaction scale of the technology market (Billion) 1818 2227 2665 3039 3907 4764 6437 7469
The average value of IPP1 in various regions 0.0073 0.0074 0.0076 0.0078 0.0084 0.0089 0.0105 0.0123
The average value of IPP2 in various regions 0.0066 0.0066 0.0071 0.0073 0.0074 0.0080 0.0083 0.0089
X. Liu, S. Jiang / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 207–233 219and 2013. As shown in Table 4, in aggregate, the protection of intellectual property in China has continuously
increased since 2008. This is primarily due to improvements in IPR protection awareness and the gradual
improvement in institutional arrangements. The second session of the Tenth National People’s Congress
passed a constitution revision bill in March 2004 that modiﬁed Article 13 and clearly stipulates that the lawful
private property of citizens is inviolable. The lawful private property of citizens includes patents, trademarks,
franchises, copyright, goodwill. It provides a legal basis for intellectual property protection at a constitutional
level. The State Council issued the ‘‘Outline of National Intellectual Property Strategy” in 2008, which further
highlights the important position of intellectual property in the national strategy. Of course, it is worth point-
ing out that although that has been signiﬁcant progress in the eﬀorts to protect intellectual property rights, the
development of intellectual property protection is not quite balanced across all regions of China. The prob-
lems, lack of awareness of independent intellectual property rights protection and the lack of relevant
resources and talent, are quite severe in many areas. In a word, intellectual property protection in China still
has a long way to go.
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics of the main variables and the results of the single variable analysis. To
avoid the inﬂuence of outliers, all of the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. As
shown in Panel A of Table 5, the mean and median of IPP1 are 0.014 and 0.004, respectively. The mean
and median of IPP2 are 0.013 and 0.005. These indicate that there is a signiﬁcant deviation between the mean
and median of IPP1 and IPP2; that is, the development of intellectual property protection is not balanced
across diﬀerent regions and in diﬀerent years. Actually, taking Beijing’s active technology market as an
Table 5
Descriptive statistics of the main variables and the results of single variable analysis.
Total sample BEC = 0 BEC = 1 t-Tests mean
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of the main variables
R&D 0.0256 0.0258 0.0254 0.0252 0.0266 0.0271 (2.09**)
IPP1 0.014 0.004 0.014 0.004 0.014 0.004 (0.96)
IPP2 0.013 0.005 0.013 0.004 0.013 0.005 (1.02)
FD 1.209 1.066 1.205 1.066 1.231 1.066 (0.86)
Size 21.86 21.75 21.77 21.58 22.36 22.10 (13.60***)
CF 0.046 0.043 0.046 0.042 0.048 0.044 (2.29**)
Lev 0.497 0.504 0.492 0.505 0.526 0.512 (3.15***)
Growth 0.119 0.112 0.120 0.113 0.114 0.108 (1.26)
ROA 0.060 0.052 0.059 0.051 0.065 0.057 (3.08***)
Tobin’ q 1.936 1.680 1.938 1.651 1.925 1.706 (1.04)
OI 0.223 0.188 0.222 0.186 0.231 0.179 (1.71*)
Cash 0.249 0.235 0.253 0.230 0.226 0.196 (3.93***)
DCash 0.013 0.011 0.014 0.012 0.005 0.002 (5.62***)
Inv 0.057 0.042 0.056 0.040 0.062 0.053 (2.86***)
Age 10.35 10 9.607 10 14.63 11 (10.22***)
Mean Median Mean Median
Panel B: Single variable analysis of R&D
IPP1 6Median 0.0249 0.0248 IPP2 6Median 0.0252 0.0250
IPP1 > Median 0.0263 0.0259 IPP2 > Median 0.0260 0.0257
t-Tests mean 6.03*** t-Tests mean 5.97***
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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bled to 254 between 2006 and 2013; however, there were only three intellectual property agencies in Gansu,
Ningxia, Qinghai, in 2013. This also reﬂects the unbalanced nature of regional IPR protection. In addition,
based on a univariate comparison, ﬁrms with bank equity connections tend to be larger, more proﬁtable,
and have more debt, net cash ﬂow and new investment.
To visually display the eﬀect of bank equity connections and intellectual property protection on enterprise
innovation, we divide the sample into two groups according to bank equity connections and the median of the
IPP index, and conduct a single variable analysis of R&D. As shown in Panel A of Table 5, the innovation
investment intensity is higher in ﬁrms with a bank equity connection at a level of 5%, which is consistent with
our prediction in H1. Similarly, as shown in Panel B of Table 5, whether it is grouped by the median IPP1, or
by the median IPP2, innovation investment intensity is higher in the group where the lack of intellectual prop-
erty protection is lower with signiﬁcance at the 1% level, which is consistent with H3. All of the above results
preliminarily conﬁrm that both bank equity connections and intellectual property protection have a positive
eﬀect on innovation.4.2. Bank equity connections, enterprise heterogeneity and enterprise innovation
Table 6 shows the parameter estimation results of models (1) and (2) after controlling for selection bias and
endogeneity using Heckman’s correction and 2SLS. The estimation for model (1), shown in column 1 in
Table 6, suggests that political connections, ﬁnancial depth in the region, growth opportunities, proﬁtability,
ﬁrm size and the nature of ownership aﬀect whether ﬁrms establish bank equity connections. The results of
estimating model (2) for the full sample are shown in the second column in Table 6. The coeﬃcient of
BEC is 0.012 (t-value = 1.74), suggesting that compared to ﬁrms without bank equity connections, those with
bank equity connections invest more in innovation. These results are consistent with H1. Furthermore, to test
Table 6
Bank equity connections, enterprise heterogeneity and enterprise innovation.
First stage Second stage Full sample Central enterprises Local state-owned enterprises Private enterprises
Dependent variable: BEC Column 1 Dependent variable: R&D Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5
Intercept 0.515*** Intercept 0.221** 0.056*** 0.389** 0.387**
(3.67) (2.45) (2.90) (2.17) (2.00)
PC 0.006** BEC 0.012* 0.009* 0.001 0.015**
(1.96) (1.74) (1.69) (1.12) (2.49)
FD 0.051* CF 0.076*** 0.068* 0.071*** 0.082***
(1.68) (2.77) (1.82) (2.63) (4.99)
Lev 0.241*** Size 0.042* 0.039** 0.040** 0.045***
(5.88) (1.89) (2.06) (2.28) (2.94)
Growth 0.269** Growth 0.012** 0.008*** 0.018** 0.012***
(2.39) (2.42) (2.59) (2.03) (2.68)
Size 0.295*** Debt 0.039*** 0.016 0.048*** 0.064***
(12.78) (2.74) (1.53) (2.86) (2.90)
ROA 0.467*** ROA 0.043*** 0.029* 0.055** 0.058*
(3.02) (2.78) (1.70) (2.22) (1.81)
State 0.027* Age 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.010***
(1.88) (5.28) (3.59) (5.91) (3.76)
IMR 0.028* 0.016 0.071** 0.067**
(1.80) (0.40) (2.36) (1.98)
Year & Ind Control Year & Ind & Region Control Control Control Control
Obs 4475 Obs 4475 929 2060 1486
Pseudo R2 0.1086 Adj-R2 0.2597 0.2948 0.2631 0.2879
Note: In the ﬁrst stage regression with the Probit regression model, the numbers in brackets are the z-values; in the second stage regression model, the numbers in brackets are the t-
values.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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222 X. Liu, S. Jiang / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 207–233whether the eﬀect of BEC diﬀers across ﬁrms with diﬀerent properties, we divide the sample into three groups
by ownership type and compare the diﬀerences in the BEC coeﬃcient across the three groups. Columns 3–5 in
Table 6 report the results. In the subsample of central enterprises, the coeﬃcient of BEC is 0.009 (t-
value = 1.69). Similarly, in the private enterprises group, the coeﬃcient of BEC is 0.015 (t-value = 2.49).
The results presented in column 4 suggest that bank equity connections do not aﬀect the innovation invest-
ment of local state-owned enterprises. We also compare the inﬂuence of BEC on ﬁrms with diﬀerent properties
using the Chow test. As shown in columns 3 and 5 in Table 6, the coeﬃcients of BEC vary from 0.001 to 0.015,
and there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two groups (P < 0.001). These results show that bank equity
connections have various eﬀects on innovation in the three types of enterprises. Due to their monopoly advan-
tages and their special role in the national economy, central enterprises easily obtain policy support and exoge-
nous ﬁnancing. Hence, the innovation advantages of BEC are relatively weak in central enterprises. However,
the situation for private enterprises is diﬀerent; the long-term ownership and scale discrimination in private
enterprise ﬁnancing, ﬁnancing constraints and policy bias hinder the innovation investment of private enter-
prises. Therefore, the eﬀect of BEC on resource acquisition and on dynamic conﬁguration capability is stron-
gest in these ﬁrms. Local state-owned enterprises probably use the resources advantage of BEC to invest
excessively, due to the government’s widespread intervention and insuﬃcient oversight of executive power;
hence, the eﬀect of bank equity connections on investment is insigniﬁcant in local state-owned enterprises.
And yet, the regression coeﬃcient of IMR shows that the selection of this instrumental variable is reasonable.
4.3. Bank equity connections, intellectual property protection and enterprise innovation
Table 7 shows the eﬀect of intellectual property protection on enterprise innovation, and the interactive
relationship between bank equity connections and intellectual property protection in the process of improving
innovation. In columns 1–8, IPP1and IPP2 are used to measure the status of intellectual property protection in
various regions. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients of IPP1 and IPP2 are all signiﬁcantly positive across all columns;
that is, in the whole sample and in the subsamples, the level of intellectual property protection (IPP) is positive
related to the intensity of innovation investment. This is consistent with H3. Moreover, to investigate the inter-
active relationship between bank equity connections and intellectual property protection in the process of
improving innovation, we include the interaction terms of bank equity connections and the intellectual prop-
erty protection index in the model. The results are reported in columns 1–8 in Table 7. The interaction term
between BEC and IPP1, shown in column 1, is signiﬁcantly positive at a level of 5%, and the interaction term
between BEC and IPP2, shown in column 2, is signiﬁcantly positive at the level of 5%. This supports our
hypothesis H4b; intellectual property rights protection can strengthen the enhancement eﬀects of bank equity
connections on corporate innovation. The testing of diﬀerent property rights groups shows that the coeﬃcients
of IPP1 and IPP2 are lowest for central enterprises, moderate for local state-owned enterprises and highest for
private enterprises and the Chow’s test of each pair shows that there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between column
3 and column 5 (P-Value = 0.056), between column 5 and column 7 (P-Value = 0.031), between column 3 and
column 7 (P-Value = 0.006), between column 4 and column 6 (P-Value = 0.092), between column 6 and col-
umn 8 (P-Value = 0.049) and between column 4 and column 8 (P-Value = 0.011). All of the tests pass the sig-
niﬁcant test with at least a 0.01 level.
Therefore, intellectual property protection has a diﬀerent facilitation eﬀect on diﬀerent types of enterprises,
which is consistent with H3. Intellectual property protection has less eﬀect in enterprises that can safeguard the
rights and beneﬁts of innovation with alternative mechanisms, such as administrative intervention. The
capacity to pursue their rights through alternative means increases gradually from private enterprises to local
state-owned enterprises to central enterprises; as the level of government control increases, the dependence on
intellectual property protection becomes weaker. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 7 show that the coeﬃcients of
IPP1*BEC and IPP2*BEC are positive, and the coeﬃcient of IPP1*BEC is signiﬁcant at a level of 10%, indi-
cating that in central enterprises, the interaction between intellectual property rights protection and bank
equity connections has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on innovation. However, in columns 5 and 6, the coeﬃcients of
IPP1*BEC and IPP2*BEC are both insigniﬁcant, indicating that the interactions do not aﬀect the innovative
behavior of local state-owned enterprises, perhaps due to the distortion of the bank equity connection, which
severely weakens the moderating eﬀect of intellectual property protection. For private enterprises, columns 7
Table 7
Bank equity connections, intellectual property protection and enterprise innovation.
Dependent variable:
R&D
Full sample Central enterprises Local state-owned
enterprises
Private enterprises
IPP = IPP1 IPP = IPP2 IPP = IPP1 IPP = IPP2 IPP = IPP1 IPP = IPP2 IPP = IPP1 IPP = IPP2
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 Column 8
Intercept 0.329*** 0.354*** 0.791*** 0.828*** 0.357** 0.416** 0.076** 0.014***
(3.62) (3.81) (3.38) (3.55) (2.00) (2.32) (2.46) (3.08)
BEC 0.008* 0.011* 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.001* 0.002**
(1.68) (1.71) (0.87) (0.96) (0.71) (0.98) (1.94) (2.16)
IPP1 0.191*** – 0.152*** – 0.208*** – 0.328*** –
(5.33) – (3.75) – (2.68) – (3.40) –
IPP1*BEC 0.112
** 0.070* – 0.051 – 0.365*** –
(2.18) (1.71) – (0.60) – (3.24) –
IPP2 – 0.206*** – 0.182*** – 0.297*** – 0.403***
– (5.39) – (3.82) – (3.13) – (3.35)
IPP2*BEC – 0.125
** – 0.073 – 0.056 – 0.415***
– (2.05) – (1.17) – (0.72) – (2.99)
CF 0.081** 0.076*** 0.063*** 0.058*** 0.085** 0.080*** 0.092*** 0.082***
(2.26) (2.64) (2.71) (2.69) (2.52) (2.64) (4.13) (6.10)
Size 0.046*** 0.038*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.048* 0.039** 0.051*** 0.049**
(3.22) (3.12) (3.19) (3.36) (1.95) (2.29) (3.09) (2.00)
Growth 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.010* 0.016** 0.085** 0.072***
(2.97) (3.16) (3.28) (3.45) (1.85) (2.09) (2.32) (3.67)
Debt 0.021** 0.024*** 0.015** 0.016*** 0.025** 0.031* 0.029*** 0.031***
(2.28) (2.61) (1.99) (3.17) (2.24) (1.67) (4.81) (5.11)
ROA 0.055*** 0.058*** 0.126*** 0.132*** 0.063** 0.075** 0.051** 0.063**
(3.66) (3.80) (3.36) (3.52) (1.98) (2.23) (2.32) (2.09)
Age 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.001*** 0.009***
(10.22) (10.23) (3.02) (3.13) (6.06) (6.09) (3.96) (6.71)
IMR 0.053*** 0.057*** 0.135*** 0.142*** 0.054* 0.070** 0.011 0.028**
(3.28) (3.48) (3.25) (3.43) (1.72) (2.12) (0.37) (2.02)
Year & Ind Control Control Control Control Control Control Control Control
& Region
Obs 4475 4475 929 929 2060 2060 1486 1486
Adj-R2 0.2765 0.2760 0.3138 0.3125 0.2940 0.2941 0.3106 0.3105
Note: t statistics in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
X. Liu, S. Jiang / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 207–233 223and 8 in Table 7 show that the coeﬃcients of the interaction terms between IPP1 and BEC and between IPP2
and BEC are both signiﬁcantly positive at the 1% level, and Chow’s test shows that there are signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between column 5 and column 7 (P-Value = 0.056), indicating that in private enterprises, the
complementary eﬀect of bank equity connections and intellectual property protection is most prominent.
Private enterprises probably still struggle to protect their rights with alternative mechanisms, leading to
greater dependence on intellectual property protection. These results are consistent with H4b.
In Table 7, we investigate whether the interaction between intellectual property protection and bank equity
connections promotes innovation. In Table 8, we divide the sample into two groups according to the median
IPP1 and compare the regression coeﬃcients of bank equity connections. In the higher IPP1 group, intellec-
tual property protection is relatively weak, whereas in the lower IPP1 group, the inﬂuence of intellectual prop-
erty protection is comparatively strong. As shown in columns 1–3 in Table 8, the coeﬃcients of BEC are
signiﬁcantly positive at the 10% level in columns 1 and 3, but the coeﬃcient of BEC is insigniﬁcant in the sta-
tistical sense, indicating that when IPP1 is below the median, bank equity connections can promote innovation
in private enterprises and central enterprises, but might have little eﬀect on innovation in local state-owned
enterprises. Similarly, the results shown in columns 4 and 6 show that the coeﬃcients of BEC are as follows:
Table 8
Bank equity connections, intellectual property protection and enterprise innovation (grouped according to the median of IPP1).
Dependent variable: R&D IPP1 6 median IPP1 > median
Central enterprises Local state-owned enterprises Private enterprises Central enterprises Local state-owned enterprises Private enterprises
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6
Intercept 0.146*** 0.180*** 0.041** 0.036** 0.345 0.594**
(7.68) (4.28) (2.16) (2.12) (1.47) (1.98)
BEC 0.007* 0.002 0.008* 0.010** 0.005 0.019***
(1.70) (1.17) (1.86) (2.16) (1.57) (3.50)
CF 0.070** 0.089** 0.091*** 0.065* 0.073** 0.081***
(2.07) (2.25) (3.88) (1.69) (2.08) (2.95)
Size 0.38* 0.042** 0.048*** 0.025 0.006* 0.019**
(1.70) (2.28) (2.91) (0.03) (1.67) (2.19)
Growth 0.009** 0.015** 0.026** 0.010* 0.022** 0.021**
(2.52) (2.04) (2.17) (1.76) (2.26) (2.32)
Debt 0.019* 0.031** 0.039*** 0.016* 0.025** 0.028***
(1.85) (2.39) (4.96) (1.76) (2.26) (2.58)
ROA 0.101** 0.092** 0.116** 0.095** 0.055* 0.063**
(2.06) (2.11) (2.30) (2.25) (1.89) (2.41)
Age 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 0.021*** 0.012*** 0.014***
(2.72) (2.86) (4.19) (5.60) (3.18) (4.82)
IMR 0.015** 0.030* 0.012** 0.011* 0.079* 0.101**
(2.17) (1.85) (2.26) (1.68) (1.82) (1.96)
Year & Ind & Region Control Control Control Control Control Control
Obs 929 2060 1486 929 2060 1486
Adj-R2 0.3934 0.2951 0.3130 0.3187 0.2930 0.3412
Note: t statistics in parentheses. We also divide the sample into two groups according to the median of IPP2 and test the eﬀect of bank equity connection on enterprise innovation
behavior. The conclusions are the same as those reported in Table 8.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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X. Liu, S. Jiang / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 207–233 2250.010 and 0.019, which are signiﬁcant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. However, in column 5, the coef-
ﬁcient of BEC does not reach the level of statistical signiﬁcance. Furthermore, the Chow’s test shows that
there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between column 1 and column 4 (P-Value = 0.091) and between column 3
and column 6 (P-Value = 0.025), indicating that when intellectual property protection is relatively poor, bank
equity connections can stimulate innovation in central enterprises and private enterprises, but this eﬀect is rel-
atively weak, especially as bank equity connections do not promote innovation in local state-owned enter-
prises and may even crowd out innovation investment. These results show the dependence of the
transmission mechanism of bank equity connections on intellectual property protection and strongly supports
H4b.5. Additional analysis: bank equity connections, intellectual property protection and innovation performance
Innovation is the engine of economic reorientation and structural adjustment in an industry and it enhances
the quality of economic development. In the long term, investing in innovation is important in sustainable
corporation development, but the huge investment and large venture can cause serious uncertainty about
short-term performance. Moreover, the public goods characteristic of innovation means that the return from
investment in innovation projects is very uncertain. The above research shows that bank equity connections
and intellectual property protection can encourage enterprises to increase innovation, but it is unclear whether
they improve innovation performance. In the following sections, we examine the inﬂuence of bank equity
connections and intellectual property protection on innovation performance. To this end, we construct the
following models.Tobin’ qi;tðOIi;tÞ ¼ q0 þ q1R&Di;t1 þ q2BECi;t þ q3BECi;t  R&Di;t1 þ q4Sizei;t þ q5Debti;t þ q6Agei;t
þ q7Intangiblei;t þ q8IMRi;t þ
X
Ind þ
X
Year þ
X
Regionþ e ð4Þ
Tobin’ qi;tðOIi;tÞ ¼ k0 þ k1R&Di;t1 þ k2BECi;t þ k3BECi;t  R&Di;t1 þ k4IPP r;t  BECi;t þ k5IPP r;t
þ k6IPP r;t  R&Di;t1 þ k7IPP r;t  BECi;t  R&Di;t1 þ k8Sizei;t þ k9Debti;t
þ k10Agei;t þ k11Intangiblei;t þ k12IMRi;t þ
X
Ind þ
X
Year þ
X
Regionþ e; ð5Þ
where OI and Tobin’s q represent the ﬁnancial performance and value performance of enterprises’ innovations,
respectively. We choose gross margins as an alternative variable for innovation performance, as not only can
innovation improve enterprise performance by either increasing output or reducing costs or a mixture of the
two, but there may also be the problem of earnings management. Thus OI is a comparatively ideal variable to
measure innovation performance. To investigate the inﬂuence of bank equity connections and intellectual
property protection on innovation performance and the relationship between them in this process, we include
BEC, IPP, and the interactive terms between BEC and R&D, between IPP and R&D, between IPP and BEC,
and the three-way interaction term between IPP, BEC and R&D. In addition to these variables, we also
include Size, Debt, Intangible, Age, IMR and other factors to control for their eﬀect on innovation.5.1. Bank equity connections and innovation performance
Table 9 presents the test results of model (5). As shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 9, the coeﬃcient of the
interaction terms between BEC and R&D is 0.056 and 0.048, respectively, which are both signiﬁcant at the 1%
level; that is, on average, for all types of ﬁrms, holding signiﬁcant bank ownership is helpful for transforming
innovation achievements into value. Columns 3–8 of Table 9 show the results of the estimation of model (5)
using the subsamples. In the group testing of property rights, the coeﬃcients of BEC*R&D are signiﬁcantly
positive for central enterprises and private enterprises, and the coeﬃcients are bigger in the subsample that
only includes private enterprises. However, in columns 5 and 6, the coeﬃcients of BEC*R&D are both
insigniﬁcant, indicating that bank equity connections have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on innovation performance
in local state-owned enterprises. Furthermore, Chow’s test of the subsample of private enterprises and central
enterprises shows that there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between column 3 and column 7 (P-Value = 0.032) and
Table 9
Bank equity connections, enterprise heterogeneity and innovation performance.
Dependent variable Full sample Central enterprises Local state-owned enterprises Private enterprises
Tobin’s q OI Tobin’s q OI Tobin’s q OI Tobin’s q OI
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 Column 8
Intercept 0.606*** 0.896*** 0.698* 0.629** 0.780*** 0.541*** 0.565*** 0.678**
(3.49) (5.52) (1.66) (2.29) (5.27) (6.06) (3.20) (2.46)
BEC 0.012 0.018 0.008* 0.016** 0.007 0.005 0.009*** 0.010**
(1.04) (1.55) (1.70) (2.08) (0.85) (0.76) (2.98) (2.22)
R&D 1.112*** 0.932*** 1.072*** 0.823*** 0.976* 0.680* 1.190*** 1.002***
(4.03) (9.51) (6.25) (5.25) (1.71) (1.66) (4.01) (8.71)
BEC*R&D 0.056
* 0.048* 0.051* 0.021* 0.012 0.010 0.084*** 0.065***
(1.67) (1.83) (1.75) (1.87) (1.56) (1.38) (2.93) (3.24)
Size 0.267*** 0.056* 0.261*** 0.042* 0.248*** 0.063*** 0.459 0.003
(2.74) (1.76) (3.82) (1.92) (9.89) (2.80) (1.22) (1.52)
Debt 0.758*** 0.276*** 0.450** 0.118*** 0.713*** 0.397*** 0.873*** 0.217***
(8.59) (6.85) (2.45) (3.42) (6.70) (5.89) (4.76) (9.75)
Intangible 0.225*** 0.081*** 0.215* 0.076** 0.220* 0.067*** 0.310** 0.097***
(2.68) (7.37) (1.90) (2.49) (1.71) (4.26) (1.99) (4.80)
Age 0.013** 0.029*** 0.066 0.058*** 0.017** 0.016** 0.130* 0.011*
(2.36) (6.19) (0.84) (3.68) (2.12) (2.17) (1.66) (1.72)
IMR 0.537*** 0.229*** 0.202*** 0.186*** 0.306** 0.389* 0.156* 0.170***
(2.64) (3.12) (2.97) (4.13) (2.10) (1.89) (1.92) (3.64)
Year & Ind & Region Control Control Control Control Control Control Control Control
Obs 4475 4475 929 929 2060 2060 1486 1486
Adj-R2 0.4370 0.4272 0.4686 0.4068 0.4685 0.4598 0.4484 0.5062
Note: t statistics in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
226 X. Liu, S. Jiang / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 207–233between column 4 and column 8 (P-Value = 0.086); the diﬀerences are signiﬁcant at the 10% level. In other
words, in diﬀerent enterprises, bank equity connections have diﬀerent facilitation eﬀects on innovation perfor-
mance, and the intensity of the eﬀect is greatest in private enterprises, moderate in central enterprises and
weakest in local state-owned enterprises, perhaps because the internal control systems and many other insti-
tutional arrangements are better in central enterprises than in local state-owned enterprises. Therefore, bank
equity connections are positively related to innovation performance. However, due to soft budget constraints,
a monopolistic market structure and the imperfect ﬁnancial supervision system, this eﬀect is stronger in private
enterprises. For local state-owned enterprises, the short-term interest appeals of local government oﬃcials and
the self-interested behavior of corporate executives are likely to distort the capital investment of local state-
owned enterprises and make the resource disposal advantage of bank equity connections a less eﬃcient tool
for increasing proﬁts. This results in less investment in innovation overall, and bank equity connections may
even have a slightly negative eﬀect on innovation performance in local state-owned enterprises.
5.2. Bank equity connections, intellectual property protection and innovation performance
Taking IPP1 as the proxy variable for intellectual property protection, we investigate the individual inﬂu-
ence of intellectual property protection on innovation performance, and the interaction between intellectual
property protection and bank equity connections. As shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 10, the coeﬃcients
of IPP1*R&D are signiﬁcantly positive at 10% and 5% levels, respectively. Moreover, the coeﬃcients of IPP1*
BEC*R&D are 0.154 and 0.140, respectively, and are both signiﬁcant. These results indicate that for all ﬁrms,
intellectual property protection not only improves innovation performance, it can positively moderate the
relation between bank equity connections and innovation performance. In addition, as shown in columns
3–8 of Table 10, we ﬁnd that for central enterprises, local state-owned enterprises and private enterprises,
Table 10
Bank equity connections, intellectual property protection and innovation performance (IPP = IPP1).
Dependent variable Full sample Central enterprises Local state-owned enterprises Private enterprises
Tobin’s q OI Tobin’s q OI Tobin’s q OI Tobin’s q OI
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 Column 8
Intercept 0.568*** 0.855*** 0.556*** 0.672*** 0.283*** 0.324*** 0.263*** 0.856**
(3.20) (5.53) (4.71) (2.72) (3.29) (5.84) (3.35) (2.51)
BEC 0.003 0.007 0.075 0.023* 0.006 0.010 0.007** 0.008*
(1.19) (1.62) (1.49) (1.68) (1.52) (1.22) (1.98) (1.70)
R&D 0.997*** 0.908*** 0.942** 0.920*** 0.816*** 0.848** 0.998*** 0.915***
(2.68) (7.83) (1.98) (4.25) (2.91) (2.59) (4.62) (10.02)
BEC*R&D 0.050
* 0.026 0.044* 0.028* 0.308 0.730 0.066*** 0.052**
(1.66) (1.05) (1.76) (1.80) (1.16) (1.47) (2.59) (2.11)
IPP1 0.227* 0.136* 0.450* 0.131* 0.138* 0.219 0.508*** 0.232**
(1.69) (1.70) (1.88) (1.85) (1.84) (1.18) (2.63) (2.06)
IPP1*BEC 0.031
** 0.026* 0.020* 0.015* 0.011 0.008 0.039*** 0.035**
(2.09) (1.78) (1.73) (1.84) (1.16) (1.22) (4.61) (3.37)
IPP1*R&D 0.583
* 0.321** 0.502** 0.276** 0.465* 0.218* 0.910*** 0.772***
(1.77) (2.42) (2.09) (2.11) (1.92) (1.90) (5.59) (2.92)
IPP1*BEC*R&D 0.154
* 0.140** 0.170* 0.085** 0.205 0.138 0.288*** 0.202***
(1.93) (2.10) (1.76) (2.09) (1.53) (1.07) (3.12) (2.83)
Size 0.350*** 0.076*** 0.352*** 0.339*** 0.252*** 0.228* 0.063*** 0.060**
(6.93) (7.03) (5.50) (3.16) (9.20) (1.92) (3.06) (2.35)
Debt 0.762*** 0.224*** 0.441*** 0.120*** 0.813*** 0.202* 0.908*** 0.165***
(8.59) (13.65) (2.66) (3.52) (5.66) (1.69) (14.70) (10.72)
Intangible 0.162** 0.080*** 0.060** 0.076*** 0.192* 0.077*** 0.188*** 0.083***
(2.29) (7.34) (2.25) (2.76) (2.06) (3.16) (2.89) (7.22)
Age 0.017** 0.023*** 0.042 0.031*** 0.040* 0.023*** 0.033 0.024***
(1.98) (3.32) (0.81) (3.15) (1.67) (2.80) (1.20) (6.10)
IMR 0.131*** 0.173*** 0.150*** 0.190*** 0.136* 0.125*** 0.154*** 0.121***
(3.49) (7.81) (5.36) (4.26) (1.79) (2.75) (2.80) (3.29)
Year & Ind & Region Control Control Control Control Control Control Control Control
Obs 4475 4475 929 929 2060 2060 1486 1486
Adj-R2 0.4382 0.4276 0.4709 0.4089 0.4879 0.4640 0.4493 0.4257
Note: t statistics in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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228 X. Liu, S. Jiang / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 207–233the coeﬃcients of IPP1*R&D are signiﬁcantly positive and that the coeﬃcient is lowest for central enterprises
and highest in private enterprises. Moreover, Chow’s test shows that there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
each pair. These results suggest that the positive eﬀect of intellectual property protection on innovation per-
formance is strongest in private enterprises and weakest in central enterprises, which is consistent with H3.
One explanation might simply be, similar to Table 7, that the capacity to pursue rights through alternative
means increases gradually with increases in government control level, so the dependence on intellectual prop-
erty protection becomes weaker. To analyze the relationship between intellectual property protection and
bank equity connections, we include the three-way interaction term among IPP1, R&D and the BEC dummy.
We focus on the coeﬃcient of IPP1*BEC*R&D. As shown in columns 3–8 of Table 10, the coeﬃcients of I
PP1*BEC*R&D are all signiﬁcantly positive, except in the subsample of local state-owned enterprises; the
coeﬃcient of IPP1*BEC*R&D is greater in the subsample of private enterprises than in the subsample of cen-
tral enterprises. Furthermore, Chow’s test shows that there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between columns 3 and 7
(P-Value = 0.056) and between columns 4 and 8 (P-Value = 0.071). This indicates that the interactive eﬀect
between bank equity connections and intellectual property protection makes the strongest improvements in
innovation performance in private enterprises, and the least improvement in local state-owned enterprises,
perhaps because the short-term interests of local government oﬃcials and the self-interested behavior ofTable 11
Bank equity connections, intellectual property protection and innovation performance (IPP = IPP2).
Dependent variable Full sample Central enterprises Local state-owned enterprises Private enterprises
Tobin’s q OI Tobin’s q OI Tobin’s q OI Tobin’s q OI
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 Column 8
Intercept 0.455*** 0.362*** 0.671** 0.580** 0.475*** 0.331*** 0.428*** 0.373**
(3.15) (3.43) (2.03) (2.51) (4.66) (5.75) (5.61) (2.86)
BEC 0.073 0.010* 0.064 0.008* 0.021 0.008 0.013** 0.010**
(1.53) (1.66) (1.16) (1.77) (0.64) (1.09) (2.03) (2.12)
R&D 0.966*** 0.868*** 1.032** 0.827*** 0.936* 0.716** 0.950*** 0.922***
(2.72) (3.96) (2.09) (3.10) (1.86) (2.48) (3.02) (3.17)
BEC*R&D 0.039
* 0.038* 0.027* 0.017 0.024 0.064 0.065** 0.042*
(1.91) (1.67) (1.70) (1.13) (0.79) (1.37) (2.28) (1.77)
IPP2 0.342*** 0.115** 0.270* 0.094* 0.240** 0.164* 0.359*** 0.638**
(2.86) (2.02) (1.85) (1.88) (2.23) (1.75) (2.82) (2.45)
IPP2*BEC 0.042
* 0.036* 0.021 0.027* 0.017 0.30 0.064*** 0.051**
(1.72) (1.91) (1.36) (1.66) (1.03) (0.99) (2.25) (2.84)
IPP2*R&D 0.348
** 0.253*** 0.226** 0.197* 0.335* 0.250*** 0.466** 0.321***
(2.30) (2.82) (1.98) (1.78) (1.82) (2.69) (2.27) (3.11)
IPP2*BEC*R&D 0.261
* 0.058** 0.437 0.037* 0.160 0.251 0.651*** 0.128***
(1.85) (2.08) (1.48) (1.86) (1.12) (1.06) (3.12) (2.73)
Size 0.266*** 0.077* 0.465*** 0.060* 0.252*** 0.095** 0.053 0.039
(11.05) (1.81) (14.36) (1.90) (9.19) (2.08) (1.38) (1.58)
Debt 0.826*** 0.168*** 0.438** 0.056 0.861*** 0.196*** 0.142*** 0.310***
(9.32) (13.16) (2.29) (1.03) (6.12) (10.19) (9.49) (9.28)
Intangible 0.225*** 0.082*** 0.131** 0.053*** 0.228* 0.088*** 0.304** 0.097***
(3.32) (7.54) (2.20) (2.69) (1.79) (4.40) (2.46) (7.11)
Age 0.059** 0.027*** 0.032** 0.036*** 0.057*** 0.023*** 0.163** 0.028
(2.50) (3.29) (2.29) (3.82) (3.53) (3.12) (2.02) (1.49)
IMR 0.512*** 0.260*** 0.112*** 0.192*** 0.060** 0.165*** 0.043* 0.066***
(3.90) (7.79) (5.53) (4.49) (2.44) (3.48) (1.92) (2.56)
Year & Ind & Region Control Control Control Control Control Control Control Control
Obs 4475 4475 929 929 2060 2060 1486 1486
Adj-R2 0.4385 0.4156 0.4704 0.4008 0.4849 0.4642 0.4547 0.4969
Note: t statistics in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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resources disposal advantage of a bank equity connection an ineﬃcient tool for extracting proﬁts. This would
result in less investment in innovation, so in this case, bank equity connections do not improve innovative
performance even if reinforced with the protection of intellectual property rights.
In Table 11 we use IPP2 as the proxy variable for intellectual property protection. The results in columns
1–8 show that the coeﬃcients of IPP2 and IPP2*R&D are all signiﬁcantly positive. This suggests that intel-
lectual property protection reduces the cost of innovation, enhances corporate value and improves innovation
performance, whether in the whole sample regression or in the subsamples grouped by type of property rights.
As shown in columns 2–8 of Table 10, the coeﬃcient of IPP2*R&D is largest in the private enterprises sub-
sample, and smallest in the central enterprises subsample. Furthermore, Chow’s test shows that there are sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerences between each pair, indicating that the positive eﬀect of intellectual property protection
gradually increases from the central enterprises, through state-owned enterprises to private enterprises. Here,
we focus on the coeﬃcient of IPP2*BEC*R&D. As shown in columns 1–2 of Table 10, the coeﬃcients of I
PP2*BEC*R&D are all signiﬁcantly positive. This suggests that intellectual property protection and bank
equity connections complement each other. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that when the dependent variable is mea-
sured by Tobin’s q, the coeﬃcients of IPP2*BEC*R&D are insigniﬁcant in columns 3 and 5, but signiﬁcantly
positive in column 7, indicating that the complementary eﬀect of intellectual property protection and bank
equity connections has the most inﬂuence on private enterprises, and has little inﬂuence on the other two types
of enterprises. In the same way, when the dependent variable is OI, the coeﬃcient of IPP2*BEC*R&D is pos-
itive but not signiﬁcant in the subsample of private enterprises, whereas in column 4, the subsample of central
enterprises, and in column 8, the subsample of private enterprises, the coeﬃcients are both signiﬁcantly pos-
itive, but greater for private enterprises. Chow’s test shows that there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between col-
umn 4 and column 8 (P = 0.061). These results suggest that the positive moderating eﬀect of intellectual
property protection on the relationship between bank equity connections and innovation performance is
the strongest in private enterprises and weakest in local state-owned enterprises.Table 12
Bank equity connections, enterprise heterogeneity and ﬁnancing constraints.
Dependent variable: DCash Full sample Central enterprises Local state-owned enterprises Private enterprises
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4
Intercept 0.130** 0.224*** 0.385*** 0.426***
(2.10) (3.82) (5.61) (4.53)
CF 0.191*** 0.183*** 0.195*** 0.260***
(6.09) (5.73) (6.46) (12.87)
BEC 0.006** 0.003 0.005** 0.010***
(2.50) (0.76) (2.22) (3.92)
BEC*CF 0.015* 0.002* 0.019** 0.022***
(1.92) (1.70) (1.98) (2.88)
Size 0.050*** 0.039*** 0.055*** 0.062***
(2.66) (5.12) (6.59) (6.80)
Growth 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.022***
(4.30) (8.16) (5.60) (6.79)
Inv 0.182*** 0.189*** 0.178*** 0.170***
(5.82) (5.20) (3.85) (2.90)
Nwc 0.029** 0.027* 0.030*** 0.036***
(2.40) (1.81) (3.56) (5.18)
IMR 0.028*** 0.020** 0.029*** 0.031***
(3.96) (2.10) (7.18) (4.62)
Year & Ind Control Control Control Control
N 4475 929 2060 1486
Adj-R2 0.1155 0.1338 0.1311 0.1204
Note: t statistics in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
230 X. Liu, S. Jiang / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 207–2335.3. Robustness tests for whether bank equity connections can ease financing constraints
In light of the above ﬁndings, it appears that relaxing ﬁnancing constraints is one of the most important
mechanisms through which bank equity connections promote innovation. Therefore, it is interesting to exam-
ine whether listed companies face serious ﬁnancing constraints and whether holding bank ownership can ease
these ﬁnancing constraints. Following Almeida et al. (2004), we use the cash–cash ﬂow sensitivity model to
investigate the eﬀect of bank equity connections on ﬁnancing constraints. The model is as follows.DCashi;t ¼ j0 þ j1CF i;t þ j2BECi;t þ j3BECi;t  CF i;t þ j4Sizei;t þ j5Growthi;t þ j6Nwci;t þ j7Invi;t
þ j8IMRi;t þ
X
Ind þ
X
Year þ
X
Regionþ r; ð6Þwhere DCash represents the net increase in cash and cash equivalents. To investigate the inﬂuence of bank
equity connections on ﬁnancing constraints, we include BEC*CF. In addition to these variables, we also
include ﬁrm size (Size), cash ﬂow (CF ), net working capital (NWC), new investment (Inv), growth opportunities
(Growth), Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) and other variables.
The results, shown in Table 12, show that the coeﬃcients of CF are all signiﬁcantly positive, suggesting that
all kinds of companies need to conserve a certain level of cash. According to the economic signiﬁcance given in
model (6), all of the companies are facing some degree of ﬁnancing constraints. Further, the coeﬃcient of
BEC*CF is 0.015 (t-value = 1.92) in the full sample, suggesting that holding signiﬁcant bank ownership
can signiﬁcantly reduce the sensitivity of cash holdings to cash ﬂow. Furthermore, the absolute values of
the coeﬃcients of BEC*CF are the lowest in the subsample of central enterprises and the highest in the sub-
sample of private enterprises and Chow’s test shows that there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between each pair.
These results suggest that the eﬀect of bank equity connections on enterprises ﬁnancing constraints is strongest
in private enterprises and weakest in central enterprises, perhaps because soft budget constraints reduce the
dependence of state-owned enterprises, especially central enterprises, on bank equity connections. In addition,
to ensure the reliability of our empirical results, we make the following six tests. (1) We use the investment-
cash ﬂow sensitivity model to investigate the eﬀects of bank equity connections and intellectual property pro-
tection on corporate ﬁnancing constraints. The results show that both holding signiﬁcant bank ownership and
reinforcing the legal protection of intellectual property rights can signiﬁcantly reduce the sensitivity of invest-
ment to cash ﬂow. (2) To further control for the eﬀect of an endogenous relationship between bank equity
connections and enterprise characteristics, we use standard propensity score matching to create a highly com-
parable control group, and conduct a contrast analysis of the inﬂuence of bank ownership on innovation input
and innovative performance. (3) We select a subsample of companies with signiﬁcant bank ownership, set the
BECD dummy to one if a ﬁrm holds more than 5% of a bank’s total ownership, and zero otherwise, and use
BECD instead of BEC in models (2)–(6). After the above treatment, we ﬁnd that the greater the amount of
shares in a bank, the stronger the positive eﬀect of bank equity connections on innovation is (4). By taking
the ratio of the innovation inputs to total assets as a substitute variable for innovation intensity, and intro-
ducing it into models (2)–(5), we investigate the inﬂuence of bank equity connections on enterprise innovation
behavior. The index of relative amounts of government intervention in ﬁrms and the index of intellectual prop-
erty rights protection are used to reﬂect the degree of government intervention within the region that enter-
prises are incorporated (or registered) in (Fan et al., 2011). This allows us to investigate the eﬀect of
institutional environment on enterprise innovation behavior and its moderating eﬀect on the relationship
between bank equity connections and enterprise innovation. The results show that government intervention
has a negative moderating eﬀect, whereas the moderating eﬀect of intellectual property protection is signiﬁ-
cantly positive. This is consistent with the above research conclusions. (5) As the socioeconomic outputs of
innovation investment appear after a time lag, in a robustness test, we introduce a two-period lag R&D
(R&Di;t) and construct the interactive items to analyze the eﬀect of bank equity connections and intellectual
property protection on innovation performance. (6) We use the chairman and general manager, to study
the separation of ownership and control, as indicators to reﬂect the ﬁrst-class principal-agent issues and the
second-class principal-agent issues of the company, respectively, and ﬁnd that in the subsample of private
enterprises, the resource allocation function of bank equity connections may be alienated due to second-
class principal-agent issues, whereas both the ﬁrst-class principal-agent issues and the second-class
X. Liu, S. Jiang / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 207–233 231principal-agent issues of the company may distort the resource allocation function of bank equity connections
in state-owned enterprises, especially in local state-owned enterprises. Based on the above tests, we hold that
our conclusions are relatively robust.
6. Conclusions and implications
Innovation has the power to promote national economic growth. However, China’s imperfect capital mar-
ket and institutional arrangements severely inhibit the innovation behavior of Chinese enterprises. This study
uses a sample of China’s A-share manufacturing and information technology listed ﬁrms from the 2006 to
2013 period and an analytical framework that integrates new institutions’ economics theory, bank equity con-
nection theory and innovation investment theory to investigate the eﬀect of bank equity connections and intel-
lectual property protection on enterprises’ innovative behavior and the interactive relationship between them
in this process. The results indicate the following. (1) Bank equity connections can promote innovation by eas-
ing the resource constraints on innovation investment, enhancing dynamic conﬁgurations and in other ways.
Therefore, compared to enterprises without signiﬁcant bank ownership, enterprises with signiﬁcant bank own-
ership invest more in innovation and achieve better innovation performance. (2) The innovation advantages of
a bank equity connection have diﬀerent eﬀects on innovation in enterprises with diﬀerent properties. Specif-
ically, the facilitation eﬀect of bank equity connections on innovation is strongest in private enterprises, mod-
erate in central enterprises and weakest in local state-owned enterprises. This is mainly due to the diversity in
the essential factors, resource endowments and corporate governance mechanisms. (3) As the most important
institutional arrangement for enterprise innovation, the role of intellectual property protection in promoting
innovation must not be neglected. Strengthening intellectual property rights not only helps to increase inno-
vation and innovation input, it also signiﬁcantly improves innovation performance. Of course, this result is
aﬀected by the nature of property rights; speciﬁcally, the intensity of this eﬀect is strongest in private enter-
prises, moderate in local state-owned enterprises and weakest in central enterprises, mainly due to the various
abilities of enterprises with diﬀerent properties to safeguard their legitimate rights and interests through alter-
native mechanisms. (4) There is a complementary relationship between bank equity connections and intellec-
tual property protection in stimulating innovation. Not only does the combination of factors increase the
strength of the inﬂuence, when intellectual property protection is weak, the positive eﬀect of bank equity con-
nections on innovation obviously weakens, and innovation investment may even be squeezed out due to dis-
similar functions. The above research ﬁndings not only help us to understand how bank equity connections
and intellectual property protection aﬀect enterprise innovation behavior, they also have implications for Chi-
na’s economic policy.
Based on these results, the Chinese government may consider the following recommendations.
(1) The government should encourage the transformation of non-ﬁnancial capital into ﬁnancial capital and
promote and encourage qualiﬁed enterprises to purchase stakes in banks or to integrate the industry with
ﬁnancial institutions, to promote resource integration and to remedy market failure and the weaknesses of
the system. (2) The above tests show that intellectual property protection not only has a signiﬁcant incentive
eﬀect on enterprise innovation, it also oﬀers an important system guarantee for bank equity connections.
Therefore, we should pay more attention to the protection of intellectual property rights, gradually improve
China’s intellectual property rights legal system, especially the execution system, and establish an all-direction
defense and punishment for violations. (3) The transmission mechanisms of bank equity connections and intel-
lectual property protection are to a large extent aﬀected by property right characteristics. The diversity in
essential factors and resource endowment aﬀects the eﬃciencies of bank equity connections and intellectual
property protection. Furthermore, political intervention and the opportunistic behavior of senior executives
in local state-owned enterprises can turn a bank equity connection into a tunneling channel. Hence, reducing
government intervention, establishing a modern enterprise system, and realizing eﬃciency and fairness
dynamic equilibrium are several important aspects in the process of economic reform. More attention should
be paid to them.
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